Prior Work

Abstract

Metaphysical, epistemic, and practical issues problematize a clear conception of possibility. To inquire about the nature of possibility, within the context of Aristotle’s notion of possibility as an actualization of latent potentials, is to question the status of latent potentiality in pursuit of understanding the role of its variability. In assessing the status of potentiality, two positions have traditionally resulted in either i) the conflation of potentiality with possibility, or ii) the subsuming of possibility under and by actuality. Superficially, these can appear similar, or at least similar enough that they might entail one another. In one sense, one could understand ii) as requiring at minimum the same conflation of potentiality and possibility in i), however, ii) needs not accept the existence of potentiality whereas i) must if it is to assume that both concepts are fundamentally interchangeable. What’s more, i) typically presents the relation between possibility and actuality as oppositional, whereas ii) merely prioritizes actuality in its account of possibility. 

These two positions in turn assume either an inflationary or deflationary posture toward epistemological questions concerned with if and/or how one can know what is possible. Just as with the metaphysical issues, one can differentiate them by the role and status given to potentiality in relation to possibility and the status of possibility in relation to actuality. On the one hand, i) conceptually handles potentiality, and views such potentiality as if it were possibility, and thus, presents an inflated appraisal, wherein possibility is unfettered by what is actual, i.e., the status quo. On the other hand, owing to what might be thought of as the metaphysical vagaries inherent in the term potentiality, ii) would deny or diminish the role and status of an inconstant potentiality and emphasize factual and historic events as objective evidence of what possibly exists, and thus, presents a deflated appraisal, wherein possibility amounts to what has actually already been the case.

Such confusion involved in these metaphysical and epistemological issues holds further significance than merely the speculative and theoretical: it can have practical implications in how one formulates an understanding of agency. In short, what is doable is understood through the possibility of its being done, and an aspect of Being is uncovered and understood through the possibility of its own doing. How one conceptualizes possibility affects what one views as possible, and in turn, it can impact one’s practical deliberations. Thus, the practicability and otherwiseness implied in possibility can be thought of as the more significant aspects of identity, empowerment and agency. However, they can be diminished or misapprehended due to some of the above issues in modeling possibility and appraising what is possible. What is required is a more precise understanding of possibility, one without inflation or deflation, which thus presents a more complete image of possibility in relation to practicable issues.

Such an option exists, one that acknowledges the interplay and tension between variability and viability, innovation and practicability participant in possibility. In contrast to the inflationary and deflationary models, one can forward a possibilia model, which attempts to destabilize any teleological certainty about the inevitability of outcomes by positing possibility as an interstitial open field wherein new circumstances arise with different, heretofore unforeseen potentials, and thus, the eventuation of possibilities more varied than what one previously conceived. It attempts to centralize the element of viable variability, of both practicability and innovation in one’s considerations of possibility. This more substantive notion of possibility finds its origin in the thought of Aristotle and is often overlooked for his more formulaic conception of possibility.

This dissertation examines these concerns in relation to the varied and unique conceptions of possibility participant in the works of three philosophers, namely Aristotle, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Bloch. For all three, possibility holds a place of significance in their work. How these authors’ interpret possibility, the status it is given, and the role it plays within their work can illuminate issues inherent in possibility, and present possible solutions to the issues addressed. 

In Aristotle, his development and elaboration of possibility in Physics and Metaphysics is crucial in clarifying his understanding of change and motion in nature. However, his emphasis upon more teleological and formulaic aspects of possibility eclipses his more rudimentary and substantive account of possibility, wherein the practicable variability of potentiality and the openness of possibility is lost. Thus, what exists as possibility for the Aristotelian agent is seemingly diminished and compromised to those actions defined by the status quo. Building off of Aristotle, Heidegger and Bloch present vastly different interpretations of what possibility is, and thus, what exists for agency within the temporal interstitial of the lived moment.

For Martin Heidegger, his recursive existential explication of fundamental structures of Dasein as the conditions for its basic possibilities (Grundmöglichkeiten) in general, and in particular, for Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic existence, requires his re-approach to and the undermining of key aspects of Aristotelian metaphysics. At issue is whether Heidegger’s subsequent understanding of possibility and potentiality within his existential framework adequately addresses the sense of otherwiseness and variability found latent in Aristotle’s conception of potentiality and possibility, and whether Heidegger’s notion of possibility presents issues for agency and power in that it either posits an inflated or deflated notion of possibility. Thus, accounting for Heidegger’s notion of possibility, and its role within his interstitial notion of “the moment of vision” (Augenblick) can inevitably clarify this notion of possibility and its role for the Heideggerian agent.

Lastly, one can understand Ernst Bloch as retrieving a more obscured Aristotelian notion of possibility emphasizing the material latency of potentiality, setting it in motion within his own conception of “objective-real possibility.” The significance of this resultant “Real Possibility” is that, within such an interstitial field, what for Bloch is “the darkness of the lived moment” (das Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks), there exists obscured and unforeseen potentialities whereby the Blochian agent pursues innovative responses in an open field of possibility. In contrast to Aristotelian “wonder” and Heideggerian “angst,” Bloch presents hope as the embodiment of such possibility and the impetus for innovation. A question lingers whether such hope is ultimately practicable or viable.

Abstract

To hope against hope is to believe in the possibility of something against that which experience says is more probable. Where these two ideas meet, possibility and probability, is as good a place as any to start. In comparing Bloch and Adorno, it is my intention to glean from the oft over harvested fields of their work the nature of hope their works represent. Bloch is of course the more obvious candidate for such a study. His Principle of Hope seems an easy read in light of the task of discerning his own notion of hope. Interestingly enough though, most only write about Bloch’s affinity for hope, few have addressed how this hope manifests itself in his work, or is even extended in to the world. Most only consider Bloch’s principle of hope and not the essence that informs it. Adorno, the darker, dourer of the two, his hope is often overlooked for the more dire and critical elements in his writing. Preferring the more tempestuous Teddy, most pass over the relationship that hope can have to criticism and how his conception of hope informs his work. In both situations, the spirit of hope is often lost behind and within the nature of their work.

In my thesis, I mean to first bring out the specific qualities within Bloch and Adorno’s works that correlate to what I would consider to be their individual appreciations of hope. Then, by placing “hope against hope,” I mean to ultimately collocate these qualities of hope next to one another, so as to bring out distinguishing elements within their work and most importantly within their own ideas of hope. To do this, I wish to present four models wherein I will distinguish each philosopher’s individual work. These models can possibly be thought of as catalytic mediums where each philosopher’s reaction to the medium can be individually registered and, ultimately gauged by comparison to the other philosopher’s reaction.